I would venture to say that a "God exists" vs "God doesn't exist" presents a false dichotomy, as well as problems of definition.
First, we have to define God. The Christian God? The Jewish God? Zeus? A deity? Any deity? Many deities? Then you have to define deity...
Also, there is the problem of defining what you mean by "exists." Exists in this same reality with us? Exists in some sort of "super-reality" of which our reality is only a subset? (Then you have to define "super-reality" in a meaningful way, which is somewhat challenging). "Exists" but in a separate reality? (Then you have to define "separate reality.")
What we can say is that religions, or better yet belief systems exist. We can say that there are many people of many beliefs (and many of no particular belief as well). We can also note that participants in a belief system usually can present arguments as to why they believe their belief system is accurate. They can also usually present arguments as to why all the other belief systems are wrong.
My own take on it is from a slightly different perspective.
Consider a computer. The same hardware can run Windows, or Linux, or FreeBSD, or Solaris (or others).
The hardware doesn't change, but the computer and how you use it change drastically from one OS to another. The experience of using the computer is different, as is the learning curve. The capabilities of the same computer are drastically different running different operating systems.
The operating system is an abstraction that sits on top of the reality of the computer hardware. You need it because, for the vast majority of computer users, there is no meaningful way to interact directly with the computer hardware or even to truly understand it at its most basic level.
I think reality is the hardware, and religions are the operating system. Religion is an abstraction that sits on top of the hardware, and allows us to interact with and draw meaning from reality in a way which gives meaning and purpose to our lives and our interactions with each other.
Does the operating system have any real exclusive relation to the hardware? Not really; as already noted many operating systems can run on the same hardware.
The the religion or belief system have any real exclusive relationship to actual reality? Again, I think the answer is "not really, but it doesn't matter."
I think when people are asking "Is this particular religion true?" they are asking the wrong question. A much better question is "Does this religion work?"
My $.02, probably worth about what you paid to read it.
Cynth wrote:I do not see how the statement "God exists" can be proven, although I cannot say why in the same logical terms.
Of course, all that is necessary is for God to reveal himself (or herself, or itself) to all the people of the world in an unambiguous form. Most gods seem to have become a bit shy--or coy--in modern times, though.
People seem to believe what they are taught to believe---I know there are exceptions. But your beliefs seem to have a lot to do with where and when you are born. Societies that share a common ancestor will tend to have related beliefs, at least to a greater extent than those which have been widely separated----but related isn't saying much.
Last Sunday (and a couple of days before that, too) Larry King Live on CNN had a show on the subject of life after death. The guests included a Catholic priest, an Evangelical minister, a Jewish rabbi, an atheist, and one or two more. I only saw bits and pieces, but it was interesting to see how confidently they all answered various questions--and how different the answers were in their details.
I don't see how a person believing one of these systems could think the other was equally valid.
I agree that if two religions make different claims about historical (including future-historical) facts, they can't both be true, so no one who understands both should be able to claim that both are equally valid.
Unfortunately, there seems to be a hard-wired need for religious belief in human beings.
There are tentative explanations for this. One is that humans have a built-in "theory of other minds", which involves judging whether other humans are friendly or dangerous, trustworthy or untrustworthy, lying or telliing the truth, and so on.
The Spotting Fake Smiles thread is a good example of this kind of thing. We constantly attempt to read expressions, overall body language, voices, etc., and we are surprisingly good at it--although we can be fooled.
The problem is that we also have a tendency to personify things that are not humans--other animals, machines, rocks, trees, heavenly bodies, and the universe as a whole. This doesn't make sense logically, but it's not unexpected in an evolved system that there should be odd side effects to abilities that are basically very valuable to survival. If a side-effect of being able to "read" the minds of other humans is that we also try to read the minds of trees and automobiles, that's just a price we have to pay. Up to now, the benefits of the former have far outweighed the problems caused by the latter. Of course, this could always change.
Mike Wright
"When an idea is wanting, a word can always be found to take its place."
--Goethe
peeplj wrote:I think reality is the hardware, and religions are the operating system. Religion is an abstraction that sits on top of the hardware, and allows us to interact with and draw meaning from reality in a way which gives meaning and purpose to our lives and our interactions with each other.
Holy crap dude, that's brilliant! Do you mind if I quote you?
"Reality is the computer hardware, and religions are the operating systems: abstractions that allow us to interact with, and draw meaning from, a reality that would otherwise be incomprehensible."
Darwin wrote:
The problem is that we also have a tendency to personify things that are not humans--other animals, machines, rocks, trees, heavenly bodies, and the universe as a whole.
Darwin, that is interesting about the attempts to figure out the survival advantage of religious belief. I suppose often religious ideas lead to organization and hierarchy and also could serve as a glue that keeps a people together. But that wouldn't address the very beginnings of those ideas I don't think.
I have just read about the first anatomically modern humans also being the first to bury their dead with objects---which is theorized to indicate a peculiarly human consciousness and some sort of "religious" tendency, some consideration of life after death. The Neandertals also buried their dead but I guess there is some question about whether they also buried objects with them.
The "theory of other minds" is interesting but not totally satisfying to me. I guess religion seems so fundamental, like language perhaps, there is no human group that does not have it, is there? I might be wrong about that. But it doesn't seem as though it could be a side result of another more important characteristic. But I have not thought it through. I guess actually I can sort of see it-----human consciousness dealing with anything not understood is compelled to judge it good or bad and then create an explanation and means for dealing with it. Enough!!! I speak of things I know nothing about!
peeplj wrote:I think reality is the hardware, and religions are the operating system. Religion is an abstraction that sits on top of the hardware, and allows us to interact with and draw meaning from reality in a way which gives meaning and purpose to our lives and our interactions with each other.
Holy crap dude, that's brilliant! Do you mind if I quote you?
I don't mind a bit.
I don't know about the "brilliant" part though--I have a feeling there are plenty of folks who would pick another adjective to describe my thoughts on this one.
Anyhow, for good or for bad, that's how I tend to look at it these days.
Cynth wrote:The "theory of other minds" is interesting but not totally satisfying to me. I guess religion seems so fundamental, like language perhaps, there is no human group that does not have it, is there?
There are no humans that don't have theories of other minds, either.
Well, that's not entirely true. There are types of brain damage that cause the victims to be unable to assess the intentions of others--or even to ascribe intentions to them. Oliver Sacks wrote about this in The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat. It's a very fundamental--and very important--characteristic.
Science and religion both involve attempts to explain the world outside of our heads. For me, religion is the first step, but it's flawed because only animals (and maybe not all of them) have minds (and, thus, intentionallity). The wind and the rain have no intentions in the usual human sense.
I think that the behavior of some domestic animals, such as dogs and horses, implies that they, too, are "mindreaders". Cats don't seem to have such clear mind theories, but then dogs and horses are highly social animals, whereas cats are much more individualistic. It seems obvious that the differences between dogs and cats in this regard are inborn, not learned.
Mike Wright
"When an idea is wanting, a word can always be found to take its place."
--Goethe
Cynth wrote:The statements "God exists" and "God does not exist" can't both be true.
The statement "God does not exist" cannot be logically proven---it is a negative statement.
I do not see how the statement "God exists" can be proven, although I cannot say why in the same logical terms. Abstract ideas are dealt with logically. I guess it is because "God" is not treated as an abstract idea but as a thing, and to prove the existence of a thing it must exist in a physical form. The "idea" of God certainly exists, but that is different from "God exists". I am probably wrong here.
.
A couple of comments--some negative statements can be proven.
For instance I will prove in a moment that nothing exists that
will prevent me from posting this message.
But theists these days, at least those who are philosophers, usually don't maintain that God's existence can be proven. Rather they maintain
that the arguments for God's existence, cumulatively, make God's
existence probable. God's existence is more likely than his
non-existence, they maintain, given all the considerations pro and con. Atheists don't maintain that
God's existence can be disproven, at least not atheists like
myself. Rather we maintain that God's existence is unlikely, a long shot,
given all the arguments pro and con.
To all: Generally when people talk of God in the USA, by the by,
they are talking about
God as conceived in the Western tradition, namely,
an omnipotent, omnisicient, perfefctly good and loving
being that exists necessarily and that created the
material universe. Atheists are people who deny
that such a being exists.
So when people ask: 'Is there any good reason to believe
that God exists?' probably it makes sense to take them to
be talking about something like that.
Last edited by jim stone on Wed Apr 27, 2005 2:09 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Here's a review of a newish book by Richard Swinburne,
an Oxford philosopher, and one of the leading
philosophers of religion. (I've omitted a paragaph
complaining about a typographical error.) Captures the flavor of
the way theists are arguing, I think.
Richard Swinburne
The Existence of God, 2d ed.
Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2d ed., Oxford University Press, 2004, 363pp, $24.95 (pbk), ISBN 0199271682.
Reviewed by Joshua Golding, Bellarmine University
Richard Swinburne is one of the foremost current philosophers of religion, and, as he states in his preface, this book is the 'central book' of all that he is written in the field. The first edition was published in 1979, and, deservedly, it has been hailed as something of a modern classic. It was a tour de force when it was first published, and now it is even more sophisticated. A new edition was published in 1991, but without any substantial change in the main text. In the present edition, Swinburne has revised several chapters, added notes, and also made minor changes throughout the book. However, as the author himself says, the main strategy, major claims, and overall plan of the book remain the same. This review briefly summarizes the book, and then poses a few questions.
The overall aim of the book is to argue for the claim that the proposition God exists is more probable than not, or, to put it somewhat more technically, that the probability that God exists is greater than ½. After some stage-setting chapters which discuss the nature of inductive arguments and the nature of explanation, Swinburne describes the hypothesis that God exists . He argues that the hypothesis is simple in roughly the same sense that many successful scientific theories have been 'simple', that is, not belabored with complicated presuppositions or assumptions that don't hang together well, seem arbitrary, or cry out for further explanation. This is an important claim for Swinburne, because, he argues that hypotheses which are simple have a higher 'prior probability' than hypotheses which are not simple. The prior probability of a hypothesis is the probability that we would assign it before judging it against the evidence (for or against it) given to us in our experience of the world. Furthermore, Swinburne argues that the hypothesis that God exists is vast in its explanatory scope. Roughly stated, since God is conceived as infinite, omnipotent, and omniscient, it will turn out that for anything and everything that happens anywhere and any time in the universe, we may conceivably refer to God as the ultimate explanation.
Swinburne then goes on to formulate, in masterful fashion, several of the classic arguments for God's existence, as well as some lesser known arguments. These include, the Cosmological Argument, the Teleological Argument, the Argument from Consciousness, the Argument from Providence, the Argument from Miracles, and finally the Argument from Religious Experience. These arguments proceed in order from more general aspects of the world (its existence; its order) to more specific aspects of the world (the fact that human consciousness exists; the fact that humans have an opportunity to provide for themselves and others; the fact that there is testimony regarding miracles; the fact that many religious people purportedly experience God). In each case, he concedes that the arguments do not deductively prove that there is a God. (He completely avoids any a priori attempt to prove God's existence, such as the Ontological Argument.) He also concedes that in no case does any single argument by itself show that God's existence is more probable than not. His strategy is more complicated, in the following way.
First, he settles on the more modest claim that, in each case, the evidence confirms or increases the probability of God's existence. In other words, the hypothesis that God exists is higher given the evidence (e.g., that the world exists, that it exhibits order, etc.) than it would be if the evidence were otherwise (if the world did not exist; if there were no order, etc.). He then builds a cumulative case designed to show that all of the arguments together (not counting the Argument from Religious Experience) make it plausible to believe that God's existence is, at the very least, not improbable , that is, not less than ½. The modest nature of this claim makes Swinburne's approach up to this point very appealing indeed. Finally, delivering the final blow on the very last page of the main text, Swinburne argues that religious experience tips the balance of probability in favor of God's existence. In expounding the argument from religious experience, he makes ample use of what he calls the Principle of Credulity, which says that unless we have some reason to suspect or reject an experience, we should take that experience as veridical. And, since he has already shown that God's existence is not improbable without religious experience, it follows that we should rely on religious experience to conclude that the probability that God's existence is greater than ½. Q.E.D.
Now for some critical comments. In the course of his discussion, Swinburne considers the Problem of Evil. In classic fashion, he claims that the problem of evil does not refute God's existence, because it is plausible to think that God would have a justifiable reason to allow some temporary evils for the sake of some greater good (such as the challenge to overcome evil). But Swinburne concedes that evil reduces the probability that God exists. This is because, according to Swinburne, in order to escape the problem the evil, the theist must add the hypothesis that there is an afterlife in which those innocent souls who have suffered evil or harm in this world may be requited. Swinburne claims this additional hypothesis reduces the probability of God's existence because it makes that hypothesis less simple. (Incidentally, this is one area where Swinburne's exposition here differs somewhat from his exposition in the earlier edition. He now considers that the problem of evil is more of a challenge to theism than he did before.) But, he claims, evil reduces that probability only somewhat, because, if there is a God, we might very well expect God both to allow evil (for the sake of greater goods) and so we would expect God to create an afterlife. In other words, the hypothesis that God exists and that there is an afterlife are conceptually linked in such a way that adding the second one to the first is not that much of a complication after all.
However, a skeptic might insist that the problem is more than lack of simplicity. The problem is that, when Swinburne reaches the end of his argument, it remains the case that in order to establish the probability that there is a God, we also face the challenge of whether there is ample reason to believe in the afterlife. Skepticism about whether there is an afterlife translates into skepticism about whether God exists. Unless there is independent justification for the belief in the afterlife, the probability that there is a God remains seriously in doubt due to the problem of evil. It is of course possible to come up with a justification for a belief in the afterlife, but that's another matter entirely. Swinburne cannot respond that since religious experience probabilifies the hypothesis that there is a God, ipso facto , it probabilifies the hypothesis that there is an afterlife. So much of religious experience has to do with the experience of a 'presence', yet very little to do, at least in any direct way, with the experience of an afterlife. Given Swinburne's approach up to this point, it seems that until and unless there is good evidence for the belief in an afterlife, the problem of evil significantly lowers the probability that God exists, and thus threatens Swinburne's conclusion at the end of the book.
Another potential criticism concerns Swinburne's heavy reliance on simplicity . Using science as a model, Swinburne argues that, a simple hypothesis has an inherently higher prior probability than a complex one. But why should we assume that this is so? Surely, a simple hypothesis has the advantage that it is more easily testable than a complex one. However, perhaps simplicity itself is not a virtue of a theory, unless the theory is also testable. In what way is the hypothesis that God exists testable? Swinburne might respond in that if God exists, we would expect the universe to continue existing, the order of the universe to remain the same, etc., and in this way, the hypothesis is continually confirmed. But (successful) science gives us theories which are testable or confirmable in new ways that we didn't know about or would not have expected before the theories were proposed. Is there anything analogous in the case of the hypothesis that God exists? If not, perhaps simplicity by itself is not a virtue.
Finally, another criticism concerns his application of the Principle of Credulity to religious experience. The Principle of Credulity says that we should trust the deliverances of experience, unless we have a reason to doubt their validity. Now, a skeptic would argue that religious experience is the result of wishful thinking or projection. It seems very plausible that even if God did not exist, people would be inclined to imagine that there is a God and even imagine that they are having experiences of God, when in fact their experience is not veridical. So perhaps the Principle of Credulity should be restricted in those cases where wishful thinking is, a priori, a very plausible explanation for why someone might have a certain experience. Perhaps the tests and checking procedures for a religious experience should be more rigorous than in other cases. The theory that religious experience is delusionary would also explain some of the vast differences which different religious people claim to have in their 'experience' of God, namely, that people 'experience' what they want to experience.
Though I am sure Swinburne would have responses to these questions, it seems to me that ultimately, the only satisfactory way to address these questions is either to come up with an a priori proof that God exists, or with a better inductive argument for God's existence, or to 'go pragmatic', that is, to argue that one should take into account the pragmatic considerations in whether or not one should believe, or assume for practical purposes, that God exists. The latter strategy is perhaps the easiest. The theist can encourage us to think about what is the pragmatic difference in whether one assumes that God exists and lives accordingly, or whether one chooses not to do so. What is the potential value at stake in living a religious life (or in not doing so), if God does exist (or if God does not exist)? In effect, Swinburne does something like this in his other book, Faith and Reason. As Swinburne might legitimately point out, this is no longer to argue that the hypothesis God exists is objectively probable , but rather to argue that the belief in God, or assumption for practical purpose that God exists, is justifiable or rational in some other way. However, it may be the best the theist can do, until and unless more compelling empirical evidence of God's existence is forthcoming.
One of my social studies teachers discussed this sort of thing like this. He drew a little chart:
G= God exists
NG= God does not exist
B= You believe in God
NB= You do not believe in God
F= You're fine after you die
NF= You are in trouble after you die
............G.........NG
B ----....F..........F
NB---...NF.........F
The point is that if you die and there isn't a god, then it doesn't matter, and you're okay. Your also fine if you believe there is a god and there really is one. You run into problems though, if there is a god, but you don't believe.
I don't agree with this sort of reasoning, but I still find it interesting.
"'Tis deeds, not blood, which determine the worth of a being." -Dennis L. McKiernan
Yes, this is Pascal's Wager, named after
the 17th century French mathematician.
He argued:
I can bet that God exists (live a religious life)
or that he doesn't (not live one)
So I must bet.
If I bet that he exists and he does, I win big, eternity
in heaven with God.
If he doesn't exist, i've lost nothing, for a religious
life is a good life.
If I bet that he doesn't exist and he does exist,
I lose big, I lose eternity in heaven with God.
And if he doesn't exist, I win nothing, I never
even find out that I was right.
Well, then it's rational to bet that he exists,
because if I do I have everything to win and
nothing to lose. If I bet that he doesn't exist
I have everything to lose and nothing to win.
This is game theory, there was great interest in Europe
in winning strategies at the time, because lots
of people were playing cards.
The problem again is false dichotomy: you are presented the issue in a way which makes it seem there are only two possibilities.
But what if there are many gods? Or one God but he raises us for nutritious between-meal snacks to be eaten in those off hours when He's not munching down whole worlds? What if there is one Goddess and She is really pissed at all this masculine stuff and anybody who believes in a male god She's gonna sentence to endless torture? What is there are no gods at all, there is merely a Something which is totally indifferent to us or our fortunes? And so on, and so on, and so on....
In fact, instead of two choices, there are infinitely many, and as such the chances of any one being correct, instead of a 50/50 coin toss, actually infinitely approaches zero.
That's why Pascal's Wager is a really bad way to bet.
Uhhhh, I did read the first one, but it was a long time ago. 
